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Enfin, il faut bien se rendre compte que le mouvement syndical 
ne peut plus se limiter à la simple négociation des conditions de travail 
au seul niveau de l'entreprise isolée. Face à certains problèmes qui 
touchent l'ensemble des salariés ou tous ceux qui œuvrent en un secteur 
donné, les centrales syndicales tentent de porter le débat au niveau 
politique et la négociation au secteur public en est l'occasion. Il s'en-
suit une certaine politisation des rapports collectifs du travail qui est 
d'ailleurs partagée par l'interlocuteur c'est-à-dire, par l'employeur-
gouvernement. Dans ce contexte nécessairement conflictuel, il est 
certes normal que le mouvement des caisses s'interroge sur la qualité 
de ses liens avec le mouvement syndical et même, sur l'opportunité 
de privilégier de telles liaisons. Soulever pareilles questions ce n'est 
cependant pas y répondre mais peut-être, est-ce la meilleure façon d'en 
entreprendre l'étude positive. D'autre part, par ses services et ses 
obligations à l'endroit de sa clientèle, le mouvement des caisses peut 
parfois sembler se rapprocher d'assez près des banques. Peut-être que 
le mouvement syndical se pose-t-il à l'égard de ce mouvement coopé-
ratif à peu près ce même type de questions ? 
THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON 
LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
STEPHEN G. PEITCHINIS 
«Industrial conflict», wrote A.W.R. Carrothers, «is a political 
event in which each contestant seeks to marshall public opinion in its 
favour, even though in the occasional dispute either side may profess 
its indifférence to, or contempt for the moral force of public opinion. 
Further, in a dispute in the public sector, where a profit motive does 
not supply leverage for settlement, public opinion may hâve to be an 
initial sanction.»1 How much influence does public opinion hâve on 
relations between labour and management and in the settlement of 
disputes between them? Are they influenced by what is reported through 
the média or by what they each détermine to be the prevailing view 
of the public ? Which public ? Without doubt the parties hâve différent 
publics or place différent weights on the opinions of différent groups 
of the public. 
Since labour-management disputes affect différent groups of the 
public differently, it may be appropriate to divide the public into two 
* Peitchinis, S. G. Professor of Economies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Uni-
versity of Calgary. 
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 A.W.R. CARROTHERS, «Industrial Relations in a New Environment,» The 
Conférence Board Record, January 1973, p. 50. 
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groups: participants and outsiders.2 In the «participants» group would 
be included those members of the public who are affected by the 
dispute, such as, users of the goods and services produced by the 
disputants, producers and users of goods and services whose production 
dépends on the goods and services of the disputants, members of the 
families of disputants, workers laid off because of the dispute and their 
families, and those who sell to the disputants and to others whose in-
comes hâve been affected. The extent to which users will be affected 
and the extent to which they will press for a speedy settlement, will 
dépend, of course, on the extent to which alternative sources of supply 
are available at the same price and with the same convenience.3 
In the «outsiders» group would be included those members of 
the public who are not affected by the dispute, whether directly or 
indirectly, and who therefore, could not hâve any interest in the out-
come of the dispute. To the extent that this group registers an opinion 
it may be motivated by moral, social and political considérations, 
rather than économie considérations or considérations related to the 
terms and conditions of work and relations between the disputing 
parties. In such cases, the question arises whether or to what extent 
should the parties take note of the opinions expressed by the group. 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE CONCILIATION SYSTEM 
The foundation of the Canadian Conciliation System was based 
on the premise that public opinion will hâve considérable influence 
on the parties, particularly in relation to recommendations for the settle-
ment of disputes by neutral third parties. The founder of the concilia-
tion system, W. L. MacKenzie King wrote: «It is not to be supposed 
that, because findings of Compulsory Investigation are not enforceable 
under penalty, findings in such cases are without effect. Public Opinion, 
as an instrument of authority, may be more subtle and elusive than the 
power of Law visualized in penalties and prisons. »4 But, the formation 
of public opinion that would exert such influence requires compre-
hensive information on disputes. Hence, in the original législation 
emphasis was put on compulsory investigation on ail matters related 
to disputes, including profits, priées, comparative wages and others, 
and the publication of ail findings in The Labour Gazette. MacKenzie 
King wrote: «The Public has a right to be informed impartially on 
the merits of situations which threaten its well being.»5 
2
 In an examination of « The Rôle of Public Opinion in Relation to the Media-
tor,» Edgar L. Warren divided the public into three groups: parties, participants and 
outsiders. Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Reprint No. 29, 1953, 
p. 1. 
3
 Loc. cit. 
4
 W.L. MACKENZIE KING, Industry and Humanity, Houghton Mifflin, The 
University Press, Cambridge, 1918, pp. 219-220. 
5
 Ibid., p. 518. 
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The emphasis appears to hâve changed in existing législation 
from one of comprehensive investigation and report to the public-at-
large, to one of assisting the parties in the formulation of concessions 
and compromises, and providing them with an opportunity to ascertain 
what knowledgeable outsiders would consider reasonable bases for 
settlement.6 Although a report to the minister continues to be required, 
which is made available to the parties and eventually published,7 the 
primary rôle of the process has become normative and accommodative. 
This does not mean that conciliation boards no longer investigate issues 
relevant to a dispute ; that reports of conciliation boards are no longer 
publicized; or that the normative and accommodative approaches of 
conciliation were not emphasized in the original législation. It means 
rather that investigation and publicity are no longer emphasized to 
the extent necessary for the formation of an informed public opinion. 
Increasingly, administrators of Acts which govern labour-management 
relations view disputes as problems that concern primarily the two 
parties involved. The inconvenience imposed on the public is viewed 
as the price to be paid for having free collective bargaining. 
Perhaps there is merit in putting more emphasis on the normative 
and accommodative approaches to conciliation and less on investi-
gation, report and public opinion. Conciliators must now rely more on 
their diplomacy and expertise to bring the parties closer together and 
to agreement, and less on the force of public opinion. There were too 
many instances in the past in which conciliators seemed to rely on 
public opinion to cause parties to accept badly conceived, unacceptable 
recommendations. 
THE ATTITUDE OF LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS 
An examination of certain actions by labour organizations may 
convey the impression that on occassion they hâve demonstrated 
nothing but contempt for public opinion: illégal strikes, violence, mob 
actions, défiance of court orders and orders of parliament, disregard 
of appeals by public organizations and so on. But, in the context of 
the totality of labour-management contractual relationships, such 
instances are not as widespread as they are often made to be. A detailed 
examination of the strike record in Canada over the period 1900-1967 
by Professor Stuart Jamieson established a number of periods during 
which strikes were accompanied by varying degrees of « violence and 
illegality.» In each period there were différent reasons: in 1919-1920, 
the main reason appears to hâve been «résistance to change by em-
ployers and governments alike» which generated «attitudes of revolt 
6
 H.D. WOODS, Labour Policy in Canada, Macmillan of Canada, Toronto, 
1973, p. 158. 
7
 An indication perhaps of the change in emphasis is the décision to discontinue 
the publication of reports in The Labour Gazette. Although they continue to be published, 
this appears to be done for the record rather than to inform the public and provide 
a basis for the formation of public opinion. 
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among workers, union and non-union alike;»8 in 1946-47 there was a 
gênerai «blow-up» after the long period of «wartime restrictions and 
frustrations;»9 and in 1965-66 a number of reasons appear to hâve 
existed, amongst which the main ones were, a lagging rate of économie 
growth and the résultant widespread layoffs, a rapid rate of techno-
logical change and the résultant fear of technological unemployment, 
and widespread dissatisfaction amongst workers with their own orga-
nizations and leadership.10 Had Professor Jamieson examined the vio-
lence and illegality of the period 1973-75 he would probably hâve found 
the main reasons to be frustration of public service employées in their 
efforts to get reluctant governments to negotiate terms and conditions 
of employment, temper tantrums associated with growing pains of some 
union leaders, and the erosive effects of rapidly rising priées. 
Therefore, the record appears to suggest that strikes, with varying 
degrees of «violence and illegality,» are a periodic phenomenon in our 
society. Perhaps we need such behavioural manifestations from time 
to time as a sort of catharsis in social relations and in relations between 
labour and management. It is perhaps necessary to the development 
and long run stability of our démocratie processes and institutions 
to challenge from time to time established and seemingly accepted 
rules, régulations, processes and procédures. Challenges compel the 
re-examination of the fundamental premises on which rules, régulations 
and procédures are based. 
Workers who hâve participated in illégal strikes and engaged in 
some violent activities hâve viewed their actions as necessary challenges 
to rules, régulations and conditions which appeared to them unfair and 
unjust. Frequently they became agitated by what they believed to be 
unfair treatment from their employers, unduly restrictive législation, 
omwarranted injunctions handed down by biased judges, and occasion-
ally by a leadership lacking expérience and courage. They knew that 
public opinion would not favour their actions, but could find no alter-
native ways to express forcefully their growing frustrations. 
Workers hâve always had a strong réservation about the nature 
and strength of public opinion : they hâve often expressed displeasure 
at what they believed to be unfair and inaccurate reporting by the 
média, which misinformed the public and created a biased public 
opinion; secondly there has always existed a question about whose 
opinion is being communicated — the opinion prevailing amongst 
participant groups or the opinion of the outsider groups. Since the latter 
hâve traditionally had easier access to média instruments, there has 
always existed a suspicion that their opinion predominated. Thirdly, 
there has always prevailed a view amongst workers that the média 
8
 Stuart M. JAMIESON, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and lndustrial 
Conflict in Canada, 1900-66, Study No. 22, Task Force on Labour Relations, Information 
Canada, Ottawa, 1971, p. 476. 
9
 Ibid., p. 455. 
10
 Ibid., pp. 467-471. 
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are either controlled or influenced by their employers, and that there-
fore, it should be expected that they will attempt to bias public 
opinion in favour of the employer; and finally, since the public is not 
directly affected by many of the issues in dispute, it could not be 
expected to appreciate fully the need for the strong stand that workers 
occasionally take. This is what caused the président of the Canadian 
Union of Postal Workers to say « if the public cannot understand our 
viewpoint then the public be damned.»11 
Thèse are legitimate réservations and concerns. But, in many 
instances the workers themselves are misinformed or inadequately 
informed. Often they are given information about terms and conditions 
of employment offered by employers, and about rules, régulations, 
procédures and on the nature of relations with employers and govern-
ments, that is designed to alienate rather than illuminate. The motives 
for inadéquate or inaccurate information differ from instance to in-
stance: inexperienced insecure leadership; dictatorial leadership using 
the big lie method; politically motivated leadership; control of the 
organization by agitators, serving spécial interests; and other. 
Inadéquate and inaccurate information introduces preconceived 
biases in the decision-making process and stacks the cards in favour 
of those who control the production and distribution of the informa-
tion. To those who accept the information as being accurate and 
représentative of the true situation, ail other information is biased, and 
public opinion formulated on the basis of such biased information is by 
implication itself biased. This sort of reasoning makes the rejection 
of public opinion a justifiable action. 
But, such réservations, suspicions, and alleged or established 
deficiencies in the System are a natural conséquence of freeclom and 
diversity. Their existence should not be interpreted to manifest a 
gênerai disregard of public opinion. If public opinion did not matter 
in the conduct of labour-management relations, then the parties would 
not engage in efforts designed to influence it; y et, both of them 
allocate considérable time, effort and resources in pronouncements and 
advertisements designed to make the public understand and appreciate 
the reasonableness of their respective positions. In ail probability, 
strikes in the public sector, particularly those of teachers, nurses, 
postmen, railway workers, non-medical hospital workers, and such 
other, would hâve lasted longer than they did, but for the force of 
public opinion. Similarly, décisions by fédéral and provincial govern-
ments to order the termination of strikes can be regarded as responses 
to public pressure. 
But, perhaps the most telling démonstration of the influence of 
public opinion on the parties and on governments is what happens in 
11
 Joe DAVIDSON in response to reporter's question during the long period of 
protracted negotiations with the government in 1975. The statement was made during 
a télévision interview, before the strike that started in October 1975. 
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the absence of clearly formulated public opinion: disputes tend to 
drag on and governments adopt a hands-off policy, regardless of the 
nature of service provided by the disputants. Presumably, if the public 
can do without the service over a prolonged period of time, or if the 
public can find partial or full substitutes for the service, even though 
costly and less convenient, it may become indiffèrent and let the dispute 
drag on. An example of this is provided by the October-November 1975 
strike of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers. Over a period of five 
years preceding the strike, the postal service was interrupted so 
frequently, and became so erratic and unreliable, that the public devel-
oped a rather cynical attitude towards it. Government efforts to improve 
it through automation and the introduction of a postal code were being 
frustrated by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, which had embark-
ed upon a policy of confrontation and boycott. The long period of 
negotiation that preceded the strike were accompanied with pronounce-
ments, threats and warnings by the union to the effect that a strike 
was inévitable unless the government gave in to its demands. The public 
was prepared to accept the strike and when the strike came it surprised 
no one. Indeed, as the strike dragged on the public seemed to develop 
a sensé of indifférence towards it, which contributed to its continuation. 
Had there been an outcry instead, the strike would hâve been termi-
nated sooner, either by negotiation or compulsory arbitration. It can 
be concluded, therefore, that public opinion can contribute to the 
shortening or lengthening of disputes, depending on whether it is 
respectively strongly négative or indiffèrent. 
Finally, a few comments on the seeming indifférence of the public 
at large — both participant groups and outsider groups — to the 
évident increase in the number of the labour-management" disputes in 
récent years. Had the public taken greater interest in what has been 
happening, and had it expressed concern, perhaps the parties would not 
hâve taken décisions as readily as they hâve to disrupt production 
processes, and governments would not hâve treated the problem in as 
cavalier a manner as they hâve done. Furthermore, the possibility 
must be considered that public indifférence itself contributes to the rate 
of frequency as well as to the duration of disruptive disputes. 
Given this possibility, the question arises what would cause the 
public to become indiffèrent to a dispute? The availability of alternative 
sources of goods and services or substitutes to the disrupted supply of 
goods and services, would be one reason; another would be the avail-
ability of secondary alternative sources of income for workers involved 
in the dispute, workers affected by the dispute and their families — 
earnings of other family members, strike pay, unemployment insurance, 
welfare, savings, loans; and still another would be lack of adéquate 
information. The amount and nature of information made available to 
the public about individual disputes is frequently so inadéquate as to 
preclude the possibility of forming an informed public opinion. Even on 
major disputes, such as the one between the Post Office and the Can-
adian Union of Postal Workers, the issues were not given the degree 
of detailed and widespread publicity that would be necessary for the ex-
pression of public opinion. The information that the public was given 
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related to some of the major issues, such as the question of automation, 
the question of part-time workers, the question of over-time, the ques-
tion of pay, but not the nature of difficulties encountered in reaching 
an agreement. The public cannot be expected to form an opinion on 
what would constitute a reasonable basis for seulement, without in-
formation on the nature of positions taken by the parties and the nature 
of arguments they présent in support of their respective positions. 
If public opinion is to be restored to a position of influence in 
the settlement of labour-management disputes the scope and practice 
of conciliation proceedings should be expanded to include the compul-
sory investigation and publication of ail issues related to the disputes, 
such as profits, priées, costs, compétition, restrictive practices, com-
parative wages and other terms and conditions of employment, and 
other. In addition, the investigating commissioners and boards should 
hâve the power to publicize the respective positions and arguments 
presented by the parties. The most effective publicity would be provid-
ed, of course, by open forum investigations: let the parties argue the 
merits of their positions and let the public détermine what would con-
stitute a reasonable basis for settlement. «For Public Opinion to be 
effective» wrote MacKenzie King «it is necessary that it be made an 
informed Opinion. » This is why he put the emphasis on the investigative 
rôle of the conciliation process. He believed that if conciliation boards 
were to examine and comment on profits, priées as well as on wages, 
the resuit will be «an intelligently formed Public Opinion.»12 
LA CONSULTATION: UN PROCESSUS 
ANDRAGOGIQUE CENTRÉ SUR LE CLIENT 
HUBERT WALLOT 
L'amélioration de la productivité ainsi qu'une élémentaire politique 
de personnel dans une entreprise suggèrent que l'on se préoccupe de la 
formation continue des travailleurs de cette entreprise, plus particuliè-
rement, dans le propos qui nous concerne ici, des cadres. 
À une époque où existe une inflation dans le secteur de l'éducation 
dispensée sur une base formelle et où la demi-vie du savoir est accé-
lérée, je suggère l'idée de considérer l'usage de consultants comme un 
mécanisme approprié d'éducation continue en administration pour les 
années à venir, et également comme un processus d'apprentissage bila-
téral pour le consultant et le client. En premier lieu, je considérerai les 
formes traditionnelles d'éducation continue dans l'entreprise. En second 
lieu, je considérerai le concept de consultant; en troisième lieu; je dis-
cuterai de la compatibilité ou non d'un tel concept avec les hypothèses 
12
 lbid., pp. 314 and pp. 515-516. 
